Do we choose our beliefs?

You mean like this Sam?

Do we choose to believe in God? Do we choose not to believe? In one sense, beliefs are not under our control. I cannot, strictly speaking, choose to believe something. In the philosophy classes I teach, I often discuss the nature of belief with my students, and point out our lack of direct control over our beliefs.

For example, if I tell you that I will pay you $1,000 if you sincerely believe that a pink elephant is flying outside your window right now, you cannot do it. You can say you believe it, you can even want to believe it because you’d like the extra cash, but you cannot in fact will yourself to believe it. Why not? Because there is no evidence for the claim, and a mountain of evidence against it.

This applies to religious belief and the lack of it in the following way. One’s parents, culture, and society may apply various pressures to have particular religious beliefs (or not), but in my view authentic belief is not produced in this way. Authentic belief is influenced by many things, such as environmental factors, but what is most important is our view of the available evidence for or against a belief. In this way, we have indirect control over our beliefs (what philosophers call “indirect doxastic voluntarism”–we like fancy names for things).

This means that while I cannot directly control whether or not I believe in God, I can control it indirectly by taking stock of the best arguments and evidence on each side of the issue. In this way, I can indirectly choose what to believe, insofar as I make a good faith effort at understanding and evaluating the best available evidence. Then, as a rational being, I follow the evidence. Our choice, then, is to do our best to seek out the truth, wherever that leads us.

Truth, however, poses a problem for the naturalist. The notion of true belief is more at home in a theistic world rather than a naturalistic/atheistic one. Here’s why. If our origins and our current cognitive abilities are completely explained by Darwinian processes, then we have reason to doubt the reliability of those processes for producing true beliefs. This is because natural selection does not select for true belief, but rather for behavior that is conducive to survival and reproduction. But there are many sets of beliefs and desires that will yield behavior that is conducive to survival and reproduction, and yet many of these possible sets of beliefs are not only irrational but false.

For example, a prehistoric hominid might really want to cuddle with a tiger, and he might believe that the best way to get a tiger to cuddle with you is to run away and hide in a cave whenever you see one. Of course, the beliefs of our prehistoric hominid are false, but they are conducive to behavior that has survival value. We are in the same situation, if naturalism is true, with respect to the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties. We have reason to mistrust our beliefs, including our belief that naturalism is true, if naturalism is in fact true. This is because our beliefs have been selected for insofar as they are conducive to survival and reproduction, rather than for their truth value.

However, on a theistic worldview, we have reason to trust our cognitive processes. If God is good, and wants us to know the truth about reality, then God would give us reliable cognitive mechanisms that enable us to represent the world as it really is, at least to a significant degree. So, while the debate about faith and reason continues, there is a solid argument that reason is not at home in a naturalistic world. Reason, rather, finds its home most naturally in a theistic worldview.

For more on the argument against naturalism and responses in defense of naturalism, check out this collection of essays. For a good place to start on the issue of religious belief, see God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist.

J.

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I’ve been interested in religion and belief for many years. I had close friends growing up who were Christians, and I did the Alpha Course a few times. What struck me was how the same material could be taught so differently from one church to another—each with its own take on things.

At one point, I really wanted to get to grips with the Bible more directly. My father-in-law was a professor and a scholar of Classical Greek, and he’d also studied Koine. With his help, I spent some time reading parts of the New Testament using a concordance and trying to understand it more deeply.

Then, about ten years ago, I started thinking seriously about the nature of belief—especially how it plays into doctrines that make belief itself a condition for salvation. I began looking at this from different angles: theology, philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience.

What I found was that neuroscience strongly supports the idea that belief isn’t something we choose. It’s not a decision we make in the moment—it’s something that happens to us. Beliefs are shaped by subconscious processes in the brain—especially areas like the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the default mode network. These parts are involved in emotional value, conflict resolution, and making sense of what we’re told. The research shows that by the time we’re consciously aware of what we believe, the belief has usually already formed. The conscious will is not considered to be involved in this process at all.

That’s what led me to start writing about this, and it’s why I’m still so interested in how people think about belief—especially those who believe salvation depends on it.

Hope that answers your question.

This what you are struggling with?

English Greek (NT) Meaning and Usage Hebrew (OT) Meaning and Usage
Faith πίστις (pistis) Trust, confidence, reliance; relational and dynamic trust אֱמוּנָה (’emunah) Faithfulness, firmness, steadfastness, trust
Believe πιστεύω (pisteuō) To believe, to have faith in, to trust; intellectual assent and trust אָמַן (’aman) To support, confirm, be faithful, to believe

In Scripture, faith (Greek pistis, Hebrew ’emunah) is more than mere belief (Greek pisteuō, Hebrew ’aman). While belief may refer to intellectual assent-the acceptance that something is true-it can be inert or even demonic, as James 2:19 illustrates with demons who acknowledge God’s existence but do not submit to Him.

By contrast, faith embodies trust, reliance, and a committed relationship with the object of belief. It is an active, living posture that moves beyond simply affirming “this is true” to declaring, “I stake my life on this truth and entrust myself fully to the One who is true.”

This relational dimension transforms faith into a saving, transformative reality.

I have bookmarked your response.

Thanks.

J.

KP

Sorry for the delay responding!
As always, I really appreciate your generosity—both in the way you write and the space you make for honest exchange. You’ve asked some really rich and thoughtful questions, and I’ll try to give you something in return that does them justice (forgive in advance if it’s a bit rambly!).

I absolutely do think the source of a belief often affects how deeply it takes root. Something you’ve believed since childhood—especially if it came from a parent or community you trusted—can feel more like part of who you are than just something you happen to think. Beliefs like that can be incredibly persistent, because they’re not just ideas, they’re woven into your relationships and identity. Often you can’t even remember a time you didn’t hold them,

At the same time, beliefs we arrive at through careful thought or personal experience can also run deep—especially if they feel hard-won. But I’d say those beliefs are often more open to revision, because they were formed through a process that values questioning.

You asked about whether beliefs grow or die off over time, and yes—I think they can absolutely do both. Some beliefs settle in and quietly shape how we see the world. Others hang around until something challenges them, and then either shift, adapt, or fall apart. That’s definitely been my experience. Some of the beliefs I used to hold quite loosely have strengthened over time as I’ve tested them against different perspectives. Others I held firmly at one point and later had to let go of when they no longer made sense.

I remember reading a book called Supernature by Lyall Watson as a teenager. It made a huge impression on me and really changed my thinking about reality. About four or five years later I read The Demon Haunted World - Science as a Candle in The Dark by Carl Sagan which really taught me how to think and discern more clearly. I realised the other book and many of the claims within it were total nonsense.
The idea of being “convinced” is also fascinating. What convinces us isn’t just evidence or logic—it’s also emotion, trust, timing, personal need, and whether the source feels credible. I might trust a scientific journal on a topic but trust a close friend about something more personal, even if they’re not an expert. So there’s a kind of hierarchy of trust at play that’s hard to pin down, but I think it’s always there. In fact I think about this a lot.

I also think you’re right to ask whether belief always needs something else underneath it—some prior trust or conviction to build on. I suspect it does. Even when we think we’re being totally rational, we’re still relying on things like: “I trust my mind,” or “I trust reason as a method,” or “I trust this person or tradition.” And we don’t often examine those foundational trust-posts unless something shakes them (which can feel VERY destabilising,)

So yeah—I guess I see belief as something that’s often inherited, sometimes earned, occasionally forced, and always entangled with emotion and trust in ways we only partly understand.

Thanks again for the chance to reflect on this out loud. You’re helping me think more clearly just by asking such generous, open-ended questions. That’s really what I’m here for. :folded_hands:

Jon

blindwatchmaker

I guess this discussion (your topic) got me thinking about the lifecycle of an identifiable belief. “I believe bees make honey”. To be convinced of that, I had to be previously convinced of, maybe, a handful of prior beliefs; things I already trusted to be true. Let’s say I saw a bee , and my father said, “Those things make honey”. I already believe in honey (yum), I already trust my father, I have already witnessed the bee, I had already assumed that the honey in the cute plastic bear didn’t originate there, so my logic was in play. At this point, I may have enough evidence to believe bees make honey, even if I have not imagined that the sweet syrup I love on toast is actually bee puke. I am confident in my belief that “bees make honey” even though my imagination, or my education has not validated my belief. Would you say I have a complete belief, or only a partial belief?

A simple relatable illustration like this one might serve as a template from which we can investigate more complex beliefs, or firmly held beliefs not verifiable by the resources at our disposal. I think we can see our internal library of personal beliefs are all predicated on previous trusts, which, in turn, are also predicated on previous beliefs. I’m not saying it’s “turtles all the way down”; I’m not suggesting infinite regress, but I am shining the light down into the black chasm of unknowing, handing you the rope, and saying “you first”.

How deep do we climb down before we “believe” the bottom is beyond our reach?

Hmmmm
KP

Powerfully stated and love your reasoning powers brother.

J.

KP,

A beautiful post. Thank you.

I really like the “bees make honey” example—it’s simple, but it says so much. Belief so often comes just like that: not from one overwhelming piece of evidence, but from lots of little things lining up—what we see, who we trust, what we already know, what makes sense to us. And the trust part really matters. You believed your dad, you believed in honey, and it all added up. You didn’t need to shadow a beekeeper or read a biology textbook—you just needed enough to feel, “Yeah, that’s probably true.”

And I think you’re right: it’s a great way to think about more complex beliefs too. The big ones—about life, God, purpose, morality—don’t usually arrive in a lightning bolt. They build, layer by layer, on things we already trust. A person. A book. A tradition. A feeling we’ve had. A moment that stays with us. A hundred little nudges in the same direction.

So yes—it’s not turtles all the way down, but it is beliefs all the way down. And some of them are holding up a lot more than we realise.
Interestingly the neuroscience of belief really speaks to your metaphor of beliefs all the way down. When we take in new information our brains process it for both emotional impact (humans are actually more emotional than rational) and also whether it can be integrated into our existing mental map of reality (based on the other beliefs we hold). If it fits well enough that’s a big part of whether are able to feel convinced and if it doesnt it’s what makes that feeling of conviction so out of reach.

The image of you shining a light into the chasm and handing me the rope made me smile. That’s exactly what it feels like sometimes—trying to trace something back to its foundation and not being quite sure how far down it goes. At some point, we just have to decide whether what we’re standing on feels steady enough.
And of course sometimes we turn out to be wrong about those assumptions. That’s certainly happened to me before.

Have you ever read Descartes? He set out to see how deep down into the chasm he could climb. How far the rope could extend. I always loved the way he set out to do that.
Interestingly when he got to the bottom and found the only thing he could know about for sure was his own awareness(because to doubt that he would have to be aware).
Interestingly he then escaped his radical doubt by invoking a God (who wouldn’t deceive him) to bridge the gap back to reliable knowledge, arguably invoking the kind of certainty he’d set out to earn.

@blindwatchmaker et al

I SO appreciate your candor, your warm receptivity to new ways of looking at things, and your thoroughly enjoyable responses. I especially appreciate your knowledge of neuroscience and how something we still know very little about is largely responsible for what we know at all. You mentioned Descartes who probed this chasm not as a neuroscientist, but as a French mathematician. I confess I have not read his major works, I have only read about him, and so my “beliefs” about him are based solely on hearsay. I suspect we may find many of our beliefs share this nebulous development, but those answers are further down the cave.

I’m suggesting to investigate, with you @blindwatchmaker, not the belief (or unbelief) itself, but the genesis of it. How do our beliefs come to reside in our heads, their “lifecycle” as it were. This may be a way to better ascertain the answers to your OP. I posit a better understanding of their development can give us understanding to how they became lodged in our noggins. That in turn may expose any culpability "blamableness” (or lack thereof) on our part for housing them. This seems to be the crux of the original dilemma stated in the OP. The contention was, first that you (and others) do not believe xyz, and second that unbelief in xyz has been adopted honestly and sincerely (meaning without culpability). Maybe if we shine some very bright light into the dark crevasse of undiscovered truth, or peer down from another angle, and/or even climb down into it a bit ourselves, at least as far as our safety rope will take us, we all just might discover something about our beliefs (or our unbelief) that we had not previously imagined. I’m going with you (just behind you) and I don’t know if I’ll like what we find; monsters may be lurking in the deep. I’m hoping we can eventually probe the dark ledges of “unbelief” to see if “unbelief” is actually just another “belief” with its back turned toward us. But that is deeper down than our flashlight can pierce from the rim; we might have to climb down a bit before any of that truth can be properly exposed.

This journey of descent is not for the fainthearted; the intrepid spelunker will require both honesty and sincerity for the adventure, but I am fully assured you, @blindwatchmaker are lacking neither of these essential skills. @Johann, you have been with us from the beginning, and you are welcome to join the explorer’s party. If you want to join the descent you will want to leave your backpack or at least make it as light as possible; we will all want to leave most of what we normally carry with us safely back on the rim.

Let’s see what we can find. What do we have to lose except our ignorance?
KP

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@KPuff
Brother, while I appreciate the poetic flair, I won’t be joining any spelunking expedition into philosophical abstractions. My standard is Scripture, not speculative wordplay.

First, honesty and sincerity are indeed crucial, but they must be anchored in truth. If our exploration leads us away from God’s revealed Word, then we’re just wandering in circles rather than gaining wisdom. Philosophical discussions often drift into self-referential systems, but Scripture is divine revelation, not human conjecture.

Second, the idea of leaving behind “what we normally carry” sounds appealing in some contexts, but not when it comes to the authority of God’s Word. I won’t lighten my theological backpack just to accommodate man-made reasoning. Scripture doesn’t burden-it clarifies. If anything, philosophy often muddies the waters, while biblical truth brings light.

Third, you ask, “What do we have to lose except our ignorance?” But ignorance isn’t overcome by intellectual wandering. It’s overcome by divine wisdom. Proverbs 3:5-6 tells us not to lean on our own understanding but to trust in the Lord. My standard for truth is not human logic or philosophical gymnastics-it is the living Word of God.

If you want to engage in a discussion where Scripture leads, I’m in. If the goal is abstraction for abstraction’s sake, I’ll gladly step aside. My foundation is solid, my guide is clear, and I’m not trading divine revelation for speculative riddles. Shall we proceed with the truth that sets us free?

Thanks.

J.

Guess it’s just us two, KP!

I love the analogy—let’s head into the cave and see what we find.

On the question of whether unbelief is just another belief, I don’t think it is. I’ve head the line before: “I don’t have enough faith to be an atheist”—but it’s usually aimed at a version of atheism that doesn’t resemble anything I or most non-believers I know would actually claim. I’m not asserting that there are definitely no gods. (How could I possibly meet the burden of proof required for that?) I’m simply saying that, so far, I haven’t been convinced that there are any.

There are no positive propositions implied by my lack of belief in God.

To go back to your bees analogy: one might rightly ask, what are the prior beliefs or trusted sources that have led me here?

For me, it comes down to this: I believe that reason, evidence, and logic are the best tools we have for figuring out what’s true. They’re not infallible, but they have a better track record than intuition, tradition, or authority. (Of course this claim is a belief too—but it’s one that can be tested and supported by our shared human experience.)

So the genesis of my “non-belief” in Yahweh is the same as my non-belief in Zeus, Allah, or Elvis being alive—or that Donald Trump has ever opened a Bible.

It’s not an act of rebellion, any more than not believing in Voldemort is.
And I’m sure you can relate to that. Think about your own non-belief in Bigfoot or the idea that farmers are being abducted by aliens who just happen to look exactly like 1950s science fiction, and who feel a pressing need to probe them in unspeakable ways before returning them to their crops.

The absence of belief isn’t defiance. It can’t be if you genuinely believe there’s nothing and no-one to defy.

It’s just the quiet conclusion one can reach when nothing has yet earned their “yes.”

Does that make sense? Does the beam from your torch reach down here?

@Johann

No prob. I didn’t mean to rase the hair on your nape. So sorry that I did. Labeling this way to connect with the topic as “poetic”, “speculative wordplay” “philosophical abstraction” and “wandering in circles” clearly states your aversion to the metaphor. I get it, and I get you (I think).0

I really wasn’t suggesting, nor was I expecting you to leave behind an appendage, like your arm, or your brain, or the truth that flows through your veins. I was hoping those would be among our assets. I was only providing advice to leave behind our familiar way of living among landscapes, because wisdom is not only found in the grassy plain above the caverns; wisdom is found where ever you look for it, that is the unescapable nature of omnipresence. We are stretched, and grow sometimes, by stepping away from the safety of the familiar pasture, for new richness found only in unfamiliar places. As our savior left heaven to condescend into our hellscape, as the shepherd left the ninety-nine to seek the lost one, as Abram had to leave Ur to experience the promise, we, like them, and of all people, feel completely safe in the valley of the shadow of death. We should be the explorers of new understandings because we know Truth is omnipresent, and we seek to shine our flashlight onto every expression of it, wherever it may be found. Surely there is truth on the surface, but there is deeper truth to be blessed with as we explore the very foundations of the world that our Father so often speaks of creating. I’m expecting to find bedrock on which the grassy plain confidently sits.

Surely the goal is not abstraction for abstraction’s sake, and no one every wants you to even consider trading divine revelation for speculative riddles. I only thought you might enjoy the adventure. I respect your decision to wait for our return. We might come back up with nothing but disheveled hair and multiple bruises, but we might also emerge, looking more like Moses, coming down off the mountain. Grab the rope, hold the flashlight, or sit in the café and wait for news of our return. I respect you no matter how you decide to engage.

Much Love in Jesus
KP

No offense taken-and no need for poetic apologies. I’m just not interested in following this particular thread of metaphor or abstraction right now. I appreciate your intention and the spirit behind it, but I prefer to stay grounded in what’s been clearly revealed.

Wishing you all the best on your journey-whether above the plains or in the caverns.
Peace in Christ.

Johann.

@blindbirdwatcher

OK! I just handed you the rope, pushed you into the ominous pit, and I’m jumping in right behind you screaming “You scream like a giiiiiiiiiiiiiiirl” (Too much? Sorry) I’m glad we safely made it past the bees nest without getting stung.

I sincerely respect your opinion that unbelief is NOT just a disguised belief (for now (smile).

You seem to accurately understand that the instant you said “I believe” in the above sentence, you felt the need to support “why” you believed it by stating that the underlying belief to what you believe is your experience, data which you called “track record”. Your defense rests on a-priori knowledge obtained from analyzing cumulative personal unssociated observations from past situations that you have deemed of sufficient dependability to have formed the basis of your belief that “reason, evidence, and logic are the best tools we have for figuring out what’s true.” You graciously add the disclaimer that they are not infallible, but have provided sufficient consistency to become “convincing” for you. You have experience in those three areas, you also have some exposure to “intuition, tradition, and authority’ which have not proven themselves credible enough for you to place dependance on them as reliable tools to discern truth.
In a nut-shell, you are stating “I trust reason, evidence, and logic. I don’t trust (at least not as much) intuition, tradition and authority.” If I am misrepresenting you, here is where I wait to be corrected.

I think you understand that I’m pointing out that believes that we are thoroughly convinced of stand on previous beliefs that we have previously been convinced of, but we may not always realize it; we may not consider from where my strongly held beliefs emerged. Even what feels like a strongly held unbelief, even if Icall it an “unconvincing” seems to develop in much the same way, and really only differs in spelling, (as I see it). To say “I hold an unbelief in Bigfoot” or “I remain unconvinced in the existence of Bigfoot” is just a different spelling of “I believe no bigfoot exists.” One comes to “unconvincing” not through a vacuum, but through the same mechanisms as “convincing” (IMHO), and in your case most likely through “reason, evidence, and logic”. Here is where I stand to be corrected a second time.

Boy it’s getting dark in here.
Enjoying the cool atmosphere though.

KP

Beliefs Are Built on Prior Beliefs or Experiences

“For as he thinks in his heart, so is he.” - Proverbs 23:7

“The heart of man plans his way, but the Lord establishes his steps.” — Proverbs 16:9

II. Reason, Evidence, and Logic as Tools to Discern Truth

“Come now, let us reason together, says the Lord…” -Isaiah 1:18

“Test all things; hold fast what is good.” -1 Thessalonians 5:21

“By faith we understand that the universe was created by the word of God…” - Hebrews 11:3

III. Intuition, Tradition, and Authority Require Discernment

“See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition…” - Colossians 2:8

“It is better to take refuge in the Lord than to trust in man.” - Psalm 118:8

“Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God…” - 1 John 4:1

IV. Unbelief as a Form of Belief

“The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’” - Psalm 14:1

“Whoever is not with Me is against Me…” - Matthew 12:30

“Do not be unbelieving, but believing.” - John 20:27

V. Conviction Arises from Persuasion or Evidence

“Each one should be fully convinced in his own mind.” - Romans 14:5

“Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ.” - Romans 10:17

“A prudent person foresees danger and takes precautions. The simpleton goes blindly on and suffers the consequences.” - Proverbs 27:12

Enjoy the “atmosphere” KP. You’re doing great.

Johann.

Dont forget me…blindwatchmaker..im there..but u ignore coz u dont want to learn things which obliterates ur concept
In continuation to Do we choose our beliefs? - #183 by Samuel_23, i have read the next part of ur reply sir..in reponse to this post Do we choose our beliefs? - #155 by Blindwatchmaker
5.Coming to Epistemic humility and moral clarity, U claim u dont demand omniscience but sufficent clarity to justify belief and ur trying to ans the question i gave u If your finite reason defines “sufficient” clarity, how do you avoid subjective bias? but asserting ur justified in withholdiing assent from unjust doctrines. U fail to ground your standard of sufficiency, thats why this debate will never come to end..u failed to ans the question properly because u presupposed ur intuitions authority
My response would be, ur “sufficent clarity” relies on ungrounded intuitions, begging the question of their normative force. Human reason’s finitude (Kantian limits) implies complex moral systems may require a teleological horizon for coherence, not immediate transparency. Divine justice, aligned with axiological teleology, ensures rational value, thus refutes ur “dodge” accusation. Ur skepticism, demanding clarity ur reason cannot supply, contradicts ur epistemic humility, undermining ur “moral compass” claim, AM I RIGHT..answer me, u are avoiding answering the one can compete with u…u are good in philosophy right..then refute me, i will gladly accept it
6. U accuse me of inauthenticity, this isnt a way u shld talke a real dialogue. Are u talking abt If style undermines validity, how do your rhetorical accusations contribute to rigor?, by focussing on style over substance..dont tap dance..u failed to counter my arguments.
I thought u researched so much, then u write such things. Argumentative validity depends on reasoning, not style. Ur focus on prose is a red herring, sidestepping philosophical substance. U have incompatibilist views, but i have the right to have my views, u dont have the right to say that my views are distractions..no double standards here @Blindwatchmaker. My argument is compatibilist responsibility, transcendental ontology engage ur question directl,y fostering dialogue. U claim i have posted demands but u misrepresent reasoned challenges. Divine justice’s rational grounding refutes ur “indoctrination” charge, while ur refusal to continue signals avoidance, not lack of good faith U are avoiding my questions.
7. Remember i asked a question If God exists—and is truly holy, all-knowing, and just—then who gets to define what justice is? Is it you, a finite creature bound by time, error, and subjectivity? Or is it God, who sees all things perfectly, including the depths of your heart, your motives, and every moral debt?
U partially engage, stating u dont claim to define justice infallibiliy, but reserves the right to call divine punishment of the incapable unjust. U fail to address the question’s standard, whether a finite being’s intuition trumps a perfect being’s rational nature, u rely on subjective moral judgment
So shall we start again, respond to me, u are not replying to the one who counters ur argument but to avoid ur “Standard” from collapsing u avoid my questions, and ur answers show clearly u are not comfortable answering it, u partially engage in it, so shall we start again, give me ans one by one…
(read my prev post on how i pointed out the faulty answers u gave from point 1 to point 4 here, take this too..
Do we choose our beliefs? - #183 by Samuel_23)
so ans my questions properly..

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how is your skepticism rationally accountable, distinct from a determined reflex?

Answer:
Belief cannot be fully involuntary if rational accountability exists-Scripture calls people to “give a reason for the hope that is in you” (1 Peter 3:15), implying volitional engagement with belief. Libertarian freedom undergirds moral and rational responsibility (Deut. 30:19; Joshua 24:15). If skepticism were merely reflexive, it would lack intentionality, moral culpability, and rational coherence, yet Scripture holds unbelief culpable (John 3:18–20; Romans 1:18–21), indicating belief involves will, not just causality.

  1. If sincerity alone defines moral worth, how do you distinguish between a sincere skeptic and a sincere dogmatist without an objective standard of truth?

Answer:
Sincerity without truth yields moral relativism. Proverbs 14:12 warns: “There is a way that seems right to a man, but its end is the way to death.” Sincerity is insufficient apart from alignment with objective good (Micah 6:8). Christ claims exclusive truth (John 14:6), and Paul warns against “zeal without knowledge” (Romans 10:2). Without an external standard—God’s revealed moral law-no meaningful distinction between morally sincere error and morally sincere truth-seeking is possible.

  1. Why is your deontological rejection of atonement inherently superior to an axiological framework, and what grounds your moral paradigm’s objectivity?

Answer:
A deontological rejection of substitutionary atonement (e.g., that it’s unjust to punish the innocent) assumes a moral standard that cannot account for divine prerogative or revealed justice. But Isaiah 53:10 states, “It pleased the Lord to crush Him…” suggesting divine initiative rooted in higher moral wisdom. Romans 3:25-26 declares God to be both just and justifier. If moral objectivity exists, it must be grounded in God’s nature, not autonomous ethical systems. Axiology centered in God’s character (Psalm 89:14; Exodus 34:6–7) upholds justice, mercy, and holiness without contradiction.

  1. If human reason is finite, how can you demand exhaustive moral clarity now without contradicting your own epistemic humility?

Answer:
To demand exhaustive moral clarity is to deny creaturely limits. Scripture affirms that “the secret things belong to the Lord” (Deut. 29:29), and Paul acknowledges partial knowledge (1 Cor. 13:9–12). Finite reason cannot serve as the final arbiter of infinite justice. Humility requires submitting to divine revelation (Isaiah 55:8–9). Thus, insisting on complete clarity before trust is epistemically arrogant, not humble. Faith, rightly defined, operates within epistemic limitation while anchored in trustworthy revelation (Hebrews 11:1; Romans 4:20–21).

  1. If morality is intuitive and contingent, how do you condemn divine justice as objectively wrong without presupposing an absolute standard?

Answer:
Condemning divine justice presupposes an external moral law above God-a logical impossibility within Christian theism. Romans 9:20 asks, “Who are you, O man, to answer back to God?” If morality is contingent and intuitive, it cannot yield universal judgments. But objective moral judgments (e.g., “God’s justice is evil”) are only coherent if rooted in a transcendent, immutable standard—i.e., God Himself (Psalm 119:142). Otherwise, moral criticism becomes circular or self-defeating.

The answer is in Scripture @Samuel_23

J.

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Johann,

You quoted “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God.’” from Psalm 14:1—but you left out the very next line: “They are corrupt, their deeds are vile; there is no one who does good.”

So let me ask you directly Johann:

Do you believe that because I’m unconvinced by the claims of your particular religion, I am therefore corrupt? That my deeds are vile? That I have never done good?

Because that’s the implication of the verse when quoted in full. And if that’s what you think, I’d genuinely appreciate you saying it plainly. It would clarify a lot.

This is precisely the problem I’ve been pointing to all along: the assumption that unbelief is not just an intellectual position but a moral failing. That not being convinced is the same as being wicked.

You seem to see the world in binary: believer = good, unbeliever = bad. But I’ve met deeply kind, honest, generous, selfless people from all kinds of faiths and none—and I’ve met believers who are cruel, dishonest, selfish and vindictive.

Goodness doesn’t map so neatly onto belief. And quoting Scripture to imply otherwise doesn’t make it true.

@Blindwatchmaker
You’re reading Psalm 14:1 through a purely modern, individualist lens, but the text speaks to a deeper spiritual and covenantal reality, not just external behavior.

The fool denies God not because he lacks evidence, but because his heart is set against truth (Romans 1:18–21).

Corruption here isn’t about social respectability-it’s about rejecting the source of all goodness.

So yes-Scripture doesn’t say unbelief is merely an intellectual position; it says it’s a moral posture.

That’s not my judgment-it’s God’s (John 3:19–20).

You can do socially “good” things by human standards, but Isaiah 64:6 still calls them “filthy rags” if they’re divorced from God.

This isn’t believer = good, unbeliever = bad.

It’s all have sinned (Romans 3:23)-but only those who believe are washed, justified, and made new (1 Corinthians 6:11). That’s the difference. Not arrogance. Redemption.

You asked me to say it plainly: Unbelief is not neutral-it is culpable.

Scripture does not flatter us. It diagnoses us.

Whether you accept that diagnosis is another matter entirely.

Mrk_16:14 Afterward he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen.

Rom_3:3 For what if some did not believe? shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?

Rom_4:20 He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God;

Rom_11:20 Well; because of unbelief they were broken off, and thou standest by faith. Be not highminded, but fear:

Rom_11:23 And they also, if they abide not still in unbelief, shall be graffed in: for God is able to graff them in again.

Rom_11:30 For as ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief:

Rom_11:32 For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all.

1Ti_1:13 Who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious: but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.

Heb_3:12 Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God.

Heb_3:19 So we see that they could not enter in because of unbelief.

Heb_4:6 Seeing therefore it remaineth that some must enter therein, and they to whom it was first preached entered not in because of unbelief:

Heb_4:11 Let us labour therefore to enter into that rest, lest any man fall after the same example of unbelief.

Shalom.

Johann.

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@Samuel_23

https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=ROSANR&proxyId=&u=http%3A%2F%2Fdialnet.unirioja.es%2Fservlet%2Farticulo%3Fcodigo%3D4231725

Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112 (2009) Copy BIBTEX
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper provides an argument against doxastic voluntarism. After discussing the sort of cases adduced by Carl Ginet as clear examples of voluntary belief-acquisition, I propose an alternative explanation based on the notion of acceptance and offer a defence of the belief/acceptance distinction as a consequence of the con-cept of belief. My general contention is: when someone acknowledges some eviden-tial states or doxastic reasons as showing that p, she immediately believes that p. I argue for this immediacy in believing and draw an analogy between believing and un-derstanding. The last sections are devoted to showing the fundamental voluntariness of intention and acceptance, in contrast to belief, and to offering an explanation of ―recalcitrant beliefs‖ within the present framework.

Bibliography: Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Ethics of Belief in Epistemology
Bibliography: Belief Revision in Epistemology
Bibliography: Degrees of Belief in Philosophy of Probability
Bibliography: Belief Theories of Perception in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Belief, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Collective Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: De Re Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: The Nature of Belief in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Tacit and Dispositional Belief in Philosophy of Mind

Johann

Johann,

You seem to take it for granted that when Scripture uses words like “good,” “fool,” or “unbelief,” it does so with special, theologically loaded meanings that just happen to support your position. But when we go back to the original languages and historical contexts, that assumption doesn’t hold up.

Take Psalm 14:1. You cited it to imply that unbelief is wickedness and that unbelievers do no good. But the Hebrew word translated as “good” here is tov (טוב), which in biblical usage simply means moral uprightness, kindness, or beneficial action. It’s the same word used to describe creation in Genesis (“God saw that it was tov”). There’s nothing in the original context of Psalm 14 that redefines goodness to mean “divinely imputed righteousness through Christ,” which is the post-Pauline, post-Reformation interpretation you’re importing.

This is exactly the kind of post hoc theological reconstruction that modern scholars regularly warn about. You’re not letting the text speak for itself—you’re reinterpreting words after the fact to fit your theology. That’s not exegesis; it’s eisegesis. You don’t get to claim the authority of the text is everything only when it suits you.

And the same goes for how you frame unbelief. You claim it isn’t an intellectual position but a moral posture. But that isn’t what the biblical languages say. The Greek word for unbelief (apistia) in places like Romans 11 or Hebrews 3 simply denotes lack of faith or lack of trust, not “willful rebellion.” You have to do considerable theological gymnastics to make every use of “unbelief” in the Bible mean something culpable, regardless of context.

This isn’t how honest interpretation works. It’s special pleading. It allows you to condemn any unbeliever, no matter how sincere, by claiming that the word “unbelief” has a secret moral sting embedded in it.

You seem to love pasting in Bible verses. So please, show us which verses provide the biblical justification for which words are to be taken at face value and which are to be assumed to mean something completely different. If that guidance isn’t in the text, then who gets to choose? Isn’t that precisely the kind of individual relativism you claim to reject? Or do you get to be God and decide what the words in the Bible really mean?

And what of my other Christian friends, some of whom have a different view on these things than you? Are they also corrupt and wicked? Have they too done no good?

You say:

Then a few lines later you contradict yourself with:

One cannot hold both of these statements to be true. So which one is it?

In your paradigm you never have to confront the possibility that someone might honestly, reasonably, and even painfully fail to be convinced, despite the fact I’ve spoken to dozens of people exactly like this.

And this is exactly what I find so morally repugnant. You’re not engaging with the argument about doxastic involuntarism. You’re not acknowledging the neuroscience, the psychology, or even the philosophical debate. You just keep citing verses, offering exotic idiosyncratic definitions of common words and then calling them “God’s judgment.”

So let me be very clear: my unbelief is not rebellion. It is not suppression of truth. It is not hardness of heart. It is the honest position of someone who has sought truth in good faith and simply not arrived at the same conclusion as you. If your God condemns people for that, then it is not the unbeliever who has the moral problem.

And no amount of verse-lobbing will change that.