Actually u have written 3 posts in a row, its too much, so I cannot respond to all of them but I can respond to this one part.
Can we use Arminius’ own words.
In his Declaration of Sentiments, Arminius articulates his view of predestination particularly in the fourth decree.
“To these succeeds the fourth decree, by which God decreed to save and damn certain particular persons. This decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere, according to the before described administration of those means which are suitable and proper for conversion and faith; and, by which foreknowledge, he likewise knew those who would not believe and persevere"
Arimius explicitly grounds predestination in divine foreknowledge asserting that God’s eternal decree to save or damn is based on His prior knowledge of who will believe or persist in unbelief. While u claim that this foreknowledge is eternal, thus non-reactive but Ariminus’ framework reveals a logical dependecy:
God’s predetination is contiengent upon forseen human responses, @Corlove13, see its very imp u note this.
This is clarified by Arminius’ statement.
“God foreknows everything future as certain… but that knowledge per se, even though it is foreknowledge, has no more causal effect on the facts than our knowledge of certain past facts has on them.”
Here, Arminius attempts to safeguard divine sovereignty by arguing that foreknowledge is non-causation, but did u see the problem @Johann and @Corlove13
if God’s predestination is based on foreknowing human faith, the divine decree becomes logically subordinate to human volition, even if eternally known.
This undermines the Orthodox view that divine counsel is an eternal, unconditioned act of the divine essence, not a response to foreseen creaturely choices.
@Johann u insist that Arminian foreknowledge is not temporally reactive but eternal. Arminius’ own articulation betrays a reactive structure, not in a temporal sense but in a logical one. By making predestination contingent on foreseen faith, Arminianism implies that God’s eternal decree adjusts to human choices, even if those choices are eternally known. This is what the Second Decree says:
“The second precise and absolute decree of God, is that in which he decreed to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and, in Christ, for his sake and through Him, to effect the salvation of such penitents and believers as persevered to the end; but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all impenitent persons and unbelievers, and to damn them as aliens from Christ.”
This decree presupposes human faith as the condition for salvation, with God’s predestination following as a response to this foreseen faith. Orthodox theology, by contrast holds that divine predestination is not conditioned by human response but is an eternal act of God’s eternal principles, which orient towards theosis, through the transformative energies of grace.
Johann, what u said, that Arminian foreknowledge magnifies God’s omniscience justice falls into a trap of its own making.
If God’s predestination is based on foreknowing who will believe, as Arminius asserts, then divine justice is not magnified but constrained by human volition.
Arminius writes:
“It harmonizes with the nature of grace, by ascribing to it all those things which agree with it, and by reconciling it most completely to the righteousness of God and to the nature and liberty of the human will.”
This attempt to reconcile divine grace with human liberty presupposes that human freedom operates independently enough to condition God’s decree, which Arminius himself admits its “according to the foreknowledge of God”. This creates a theological inconsistency:
If God’s omniscience eternally knows human choices, and His predestination is based on those choices, then human autexousion effectively dictates the shape of divine predestination. This undermines divine sovereignty, as God’s eternal will becomes dependent on creaturely decisions, even if foreknown.
Orthodoxy avoids this huge blunder of Arimius by affirming that divine predestination is an eternal act of the logoi, not contingent upon human response, as St. Gregory Palamas teaches that God’s uncreated energies enable human participation in divine life without coercion, preserving autexousion within the framework of divine initiative. The Arminian view, fails to maintain this balance, it subordinates divine action to foreseen human faith, rendering predestination logically reaction despite claims of eternality.