William Lane Craig vs. Christopher Hitchens
Ever listened to this debate @Emre ? And give me your thoughts before I engage?
If the universe began to exist and its cause is timeless, spaceless, immaterial, and enormously powerful, what best explains the transition from a timeless cause to a temporal effect unless that cause possesses volition, since an impersonal and mechanically sufficient cause would produce its effect eternally rather than at a finite point in time.
Do you affirm the existence of objective moral obligations, and if so, on what metaphysical basis are such obligations grounded if the Creator neither reveals moral law nor exercises evaluative authority over human actions, given that obligation appears to imply not merely design but personal authority and accountability.
If God created rational beings capable of knowing truth and pursuing ultimate meaning, what explanation is there for permanent divine non-communication, and does the hypothesis of total revelatory silence better account for human religious consciousness than the possibility of selective historical revelation.
Does your understanding of the Creator include intrinsic teleology, such that the universe and human life possess real purpose, or does it account only for origin without intention, and if purpose is affirmed, how is that purpose epistemically accessible in the absence of disclosure from the one who intends it.
What is your epistemological justification for affirming a Creator while denying the possibility of revelation or miracle, and is that denial based on evidential evaluation of specific historical claims or on a prior methodological commitment that restricts divine action to the initial moment of cosmogenesis.
If a transcendent Creator exists, what principled metaphysical reason would render a resurrection event impossible, since the denial of such an event would require either a limitation on divine power or an assumption about the closed nature of physical causation that itself requires philosophical defense.
Is it coherent to maintain that a Creator capable of intentional action in bringing about a rationally structured universe is nevertheless permanently non-relational, given that the act of creation itself appears to be purposive and thus expressive of rational agency.
If God establishes a morally significant world in which human choices carry genuine weight, how should one understand divine non-involvement in relation to the moral character traditionally attributed to deity, and does permanent non-engagement risk collapsing into functional indifference.
Finally, is your deism the result of a positive philosophical construction developed independently of revealed religion, or is it a residual position formed by subtracting specific doctrines such as incarnation and miracle from a broader theistic framework, and how does that origin affect its explanatory completeness.
…and we’ll take it from here brother.
J.