That said @Bruce_Leiter
Geisler is partly correct in what he affirms, but his argument is linguistically and exegetically flawed in how it gets there, and several of his claims overstep what 1 Corinthians 15 actually says at the levels of morphology, syntax, and Pauline anthropology.
At the level of Paul’s basic intent, Geisler is right to reject the idea that Paul teaches reincarnation or a resurrection that discards embodiment altogether, since Paul clearly insists on σῶμα as the constant referent and explicitly denies a merely disembodied afterlife, so the general direction of his conclusion aligns with mainstream Pauline scholarship.
However, Geisler’s case becomes problematic when he equates continuity of identity with numerical sameness of physical matter, because Paul never argues for the persistence of the same flesh, bones, or biological material, and Geisler imports this claim from Gospel resurrection narratives rather than deriving it from the syntax and semantics of 1 Corinthians 15 itself.
Morphologically, Geisler does not engage the critical fact that ψυχικός and πνευματικός are both relational adjectives formed with the same ~-ικός suffix, which grammatically encodes mode of existence or governing principle, ~a statement about material composition, so his insistence that Paul is explicitly defending physical material continuity exceeds what the morphology can support.
Syntactically, Paul’s seed metaphor does ~not argue that the plant is numerically identical to the seed, but that identity through transformation and Paul explicitly says “you do ~not sow the body that shall be,” which grammatically weakens Geisler’s claim that Paul is defending strict bodily sameness at the material level.
Geisler’s appeal to the seed being “genetically and physically connected” reflects modern biological assumptions that are anachronistic when read back into Paul’s metaphor, since Paul’s rhetorical point concerns continuity of kind and divine givenness, not material persistence in a scientific sense.
His claim that the resurrection changes are “accidental, not substantial” imports Aristotelian–Thomistic metaphysical categories that Paul himself does ~not use, and while such categories may be theologically defensible within a later systematic framework, they are exegetically imposed rather than textually derived.
The appeal to Jesus’ resurrection body in the Gospels is theologically relevant but exegetically indirect, because Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 does ~not ground his argument in the physical properties of Jesus’ post-resurrection body, but in Adam–Christ typology and Spirit~life contrast, so Geisler conflates canonical synthesis with Pauline exegesis.
Moreover, Paul explicitly says that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. 15:50), which Geisler does ~not adequately integrate into his argument, since this phrase strongly qualifies any claim that the resurrection body remains “physical” in the ordinary biological sense.
What Paul actually affirms, grammatically and conceptually, is continuity of embodied identity under radically transformed conditions of existence, where the body is no longer governed by ψυχή (mortal life~principle) but by πνεῦμα (eschatological divine life), and this is a subtler claim than Geisler’s flesh~and~bones continuity model allows.
In sum, Geisler is correct in denying reincarnation and disembodiment, but he is ~not correct in claiming that Paul teaches the resurrection of the numerically same physical body as presently constituted, because that conclusion is driven more by later metaphysical theology and Gospel harmonization than by the morphology, syntax, and rhetoric of 1 Corinthians 15 itself.
J.